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“After 12 years, support for Windows XP will end on April 8, 2014.” So 
proclaims a Microsoft website with a helpful clock counting down the days. 
“What does this mean?” the website asks. “It means you should take action.” 
You should “migrate to a current supported operating system – such as 
Windows 8.1 – so you can receive regular security updates to protect [your] 
computer from malicious attacks.”1 
The costs of mass migration will be immense. About 30% of all desktop 
PCs are running Windows XP right now.2 An estimated 10% of the U.S. 
government’s computers run Windows XP, including “thousands of 
computers on classified military and diplomatic networks.”3 And the costs of 
staying put? They will be enormous, too. It turns out that 95% of the world’s 
ATMs are powered by Windows XP, and there is no readily available 
substitute in the offing. In one example of these exorbitant costs, the price of 
either extending support or upgrading to another version of Windows for 
each of Britain’s major banks will be in the hundreds of millions. Costs will 
be similar, or perhaps even higher, worldwide.4 
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The failure to continue to patch unpatched computers will also have 
serious ramifications for society. Hackers will keep scouring Windows XP 
for flaws, holes, and vulnerabilities for many years after Microsoft ends 
support for its vaunted operating system. Zero-day vulnerabilities—flaws 
hackers have long known about but have waited to exploit for fear that the 
vulnerability will be immediately patched (and could therefore only be used 
once or for a short time)—will now be exploitable in perpetuity.5 Experts 
“have repeatedly warned that April 8 could spark a hacker feeding frenzy.”6 
Yet, ironically, those who run Windows XP pose a greater threat to others 
than to themselves. 
In the special case of governments, enterprise businesses, and financial 
institutions, failure to patch or migrate will expose the personal data of 
millions of individuals to theft, fraud, and abuse. When the wave of security 
breaches from unpatched machines arrives, the lawsuits against companies 
for failure to secure user data properly will become even more costly.7 There 
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may also be immense blows to consumer confidence, leading to welfare-
reducing market-wide substitutions away from e-commerce.8 
Meanwhile, the many millions of consumers who do not realize the 
increased vulnerability of their desktop operating systems will continue to 
use Microsoft Windows XP. Perhaps they will do so because they do not 
believe they are at risk. They will say that they do not do any of their 
personal banking or shopping on their home computers, and they will assert 
that they do not check their email or visit social networks. As a result, they 
will conclude that they do not see the “need” to upgrade.9 Yet, as long as they 
connect to the internet, their continued use of XP stands to cost society 
millions of dollars. 
Computers do not use much of their powerful data-processing capability 
or much of their available internet bandwidth from moment to moment. 
Hackers love nothing more than to sneak onto computers and turn them 
into secret weapons whose idle bandwidth can be used to block traffic to 
enterprise websites through Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (“DDoS 
Attacks”) and whose resources can be secretly co-opted to send millions of 
spam emails. These hackers also relentlessly use computers to break 
enterprise encryptions or reroute internet connections, which enables them 
to pretend that their attacks on sensitive infrastructure originate from any 
one of potentially millions of zombie computers.10 
For these reasons, Microsoft Windows XP’s end of support, combined 
with a collective action problem stemming from individual users’ failure to 
realize or internalize the costs of not migrating or upgrading their operating 
systems, could prove catastrophic. 
All of this could be avoided if Microsoft, as well as other intellectual 
property owners who have monopoly power in a product market, allowed 
for the creation of robust aftermarkets if they themselves elect to end 
support. They could do this voluntarily. In Microsoft’s case, it could do so by 
releasing Windows XP’s source code—the fundamental organizing 
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instructions that make the program operate—under a carefully 
circumscribed global license.11 
But the law could also obligate Microsoft to aid in the creation of such a 
market, although here things turn murky. Under the leading understanding 
of existing antitrust doctrine, if Windows XP were real property—a 
photocopier, for example—the law would obligate Microsoft to help other 
companies create an aftermarket for Windows XP support. Because 
Microsoft Windows XP is not just property but intellectual property, 
however, courts have been more reluctant to recognize a monopoly 
exception to intellectual property protections. They should not be. 
The following essay briefly sketches out the argument for why software 
monopolists should be legally required to help other companies provide 
ongoing support for their products. First, the essay describes the conceptual 
and economic theories that would support such a requirement. Second, it 
describes the conflicting law governing the intersection between intellectual 
property and antitrust. Third, it exhorts Microsoft to extend the support 
clock, release its source code, or make clear to the world that should anyone 
else wish to take on the task of providing future security support for 
Windows XP, Microsoft will help them to do so. 
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY’S IMPERFECT ANALOGY TO “PROPERTY” 
Software does not work quite like ordinary property. We ordinarily 
think of goods as perishable or durable. Mostly, we worry about monopolies 
over perishable goods, which can be used only once, in contrast to durable 
goods, which can be used many times. Software appears to be a durable 
good, and many economists subscribe to the view that durable goods cannot 
be monopolized. Ronald Coase famously sketched a seven-page note that 
“convincingly explained why a durapolist”—that is, a durable-goods 
monopolist—“might not be able to exercise market power even if it held a 
market share of 100 percent.”12 
In two important respects, however, software is not quite a classic 
durable good. First, unlike in the case of a classic durable good, like a ten-
year lightbulb, the world in which software exists is always shifting. In 
particular, hackers pose a constant threat to software security, which means 
that a consumer could go to bed on a Monday with a fully operational 
supercomputer handling tens of billions of consumer credit transactions and 
wake up on a Tuesday with a brick (that is, “an electronic device . . . that, due 
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to a serious misconfiguration, corrupted firmware, or a hardware problem, 
can no longer function”13). 
Second, when it comes to software, only the developer generally 
possesses the source code. This is both because the copyright laws make it 
illegal to copy source code and because it is easy to encrypt this code and 
keep it secret. As such, it is frequently, if not always, the case that only the 
maker of a software program—or those who are authorized by its maker—
has the information he needs to fix software. 
This is not how most property works. A Chevy does not expire because 
Chevrolet decides to stop making the parts. If Chevrolet discontinues 
making parts or ceases offering repair services, markets spring to life because 
replacing a bolt, a casing, or a tire does not require someone to know how 
the whole car fits together. Not so with software. Without access to the 
source code, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to fix a software program. 
As a result, software like Windows XP starts to appear less and less 
durable, with its product market increasingly easy to monopolize. There are 
high barriers to entry (you have to create an entirely new operating system of 
your own to compete) and high switching costs (consumers have already 
invested in many programs that only work with Windows XP), and 
Microsoft has total control over the product’s aftermarket (because only it 
possesses the source code and hence the ability to manipulate the code). This 
last point is the most important. Durapolists “often argue that, in their case, 
secondary markets . . . limit their ability to exercise market power.”14 But 
when other firms cannot intervene to keep Windows XP a viable competitor 
of a newer version of Windows, Microsoft can use the decision to 
discontinue support for Windows XP as an opportunity to ensure that 
consumers switch to Windows’ next iteration.15 
II. THE UNEASY INTERSECTION BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
MONOPOLY 
The law of antitrust is a mess, especially when it comes to durable-goods 
monopolists. For physical goods, the leading case governing monopolists 
who attempt to exercise control over aftermarkets has held that the antitrust 
laws can create a duty to deal with those who seek to provide services or 
maintenance for the monopoly good. By contrast, in cases addressing 
intellectual goods, the opposite seems to hold. 
In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., the Supreme 
Court’s leading statement on the duties of physical durable-goods 
monopolists, the Court held that a durable-goods seller could be required to 
sell spare parts for its “complex business machines . . . high-volume 
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photocopiers[,] and micrographic equipment” to competitors, who would 
perform the actual installation and support services.16 The Court held that 
Kodak’s refusal to sell parts to Independent Service Organizations (“ISOs”) 
made it more difficult for them to sell services for Kodak machines, and, as a 
result, “ISOs were unable to obtain parts from reliable sources . . . and many 
were forced out of business, while others lost substantial revenues . . . [and] 
[c]ustomers were forced to switch to Kodak service even though they 
preferred ISO service.”17 
Kodak, then, could stand for the principle that where a durable-good 
provider (Kodak was not even a monopolist in the copier market) can 
control the aftermarket for maintenance on its product, it has a duty to aid 
rival providers in making that aftermarket competitive. The rationale of 
Kodak is that a company’s creation of one really great product should not 
entitle it to either renegotiate an expensive support plan at some later date or 
force users to switch to another one of its products—at least, not without 
giving competitors the opportunity to offer a third option: a reasonably 
priced support plan of their own. 
Examining the legal developments in the wake of Kodak, particularly its 
interactions with intellectual property laws, shows that the case’s core 
principle has not taken hold.18 In one of the leading cases at the intersection 
of durable-goods monopoly and intellectual property—yet another lawsuit 
over photocopiers—the Federal Circuit held that there is no duty to help 
create an aftermarket for goods protected by intellectual property rights. The 
patent and copyright laws affirmatively protected from antitrust scrutiny 
Xerox’s refusal to sell or license its patented and copyrighted products to 
ISOs. Troublingly, the Xerox case was nearly identical to Kodak except that 
the parts Xerox refused to sell or license were either patented or 
copyrighted.19 A similar rationale held in another major case following 
Kodak, this one out of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In 
Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., the Ninth Circuit 
admirably declined to adopt a per se exemption from antitrust liability where 
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a party refuses to sell or license intellectual property. But the court did hold 
that the existence of such intellectual property rights creates a presumption 
of legitimate business justification for anticompetitive conduct.20 
III. SOLUTION: SOFTWARE AS PROPERTY LIKE ANY OTHER 
The intellectual property–antitrust cases seem to overlook the animating 
purpose behind these laws: consumer welfare. Presently, two cross-cutting 
intellectual property paradigms protect software as intellectual property: (1) 
the patent laws that protect any properly patented new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter (lasting roughly twenty 
years) and (2) the copyright laws that protect original works of authorship 
from unauthorized reproduction, derivation, distribution, performance, or 
display (lasting roughly a century).21 These two statutes are meant to 
promote innovation. The antitrust laws, by contrast, are intended to prevent 
firms from controlling prices or excluding competition.22 But all three of 
these regulatory frameworks are designed, in the end, to enhance consumer 
welfare. 
By electing to end support for Windows XP while guarding the secrecy 
of its source code and threatening to punish those who copy the code as part 
of their own efforts to continue to produce security updates, Microsoft does 
in fact exercise its statutory property right to prevent unauthorized copying. 
But it also obtains power over price. Given the purposes of both sets of laws, 
the ultimate question should be whether Microsoft’s decision to prevent 
anyone from maintaining Windows XP as a secure, viable operating system 
reduces overall consumer welfare. 
The math is not even close. 
Thousands of companies would gladly pay Microsoft—or anyone—to 
ensure that the millions of people who will not be switching to a newer 
version of Windows XP on April 8 do not become unwitting soldiers in 
hackers’ botnet armies. Governments that invest billions in consumer 
protection would readily pay to protect those consumers from the effects of 
Microsoft’s decision to end support. While there may be harms to future 
innovation that might result from requiring Microsoft potentially to disclose 
the inner-workings of a thirteen-year-old operating system to some 
aftermarket competitors, Microsoft itself could prevent any such harm by 
simply continuing to offer support itself. Or, even more admirably, 
Microsoft could simply release the Windows XP source code. 
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L.J. 241, 247–48 (1987) (explaining that “market power” and “monopoly power” both refer to 
companies’ ability to “price profitably above marginal cost” but represent two independent 
means of achieving this end—controlling prices or excluding competition—approximately 
corresponding to the twin prongs in du Pont). 
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Unfortunately, the legal system offers few paths to a remedy. Microsoft’s 
Windows XP source code is already secret, and no legitimate business would 
reverse engineer the code simply to face a devastating copyright lawsuit. 
Furthermore, because companies lack access to the source code and 
therefore cannot otherwise articulate a way that they could create an 
aftermarket in Windows XP security updates and patches, it is almost 
inconceivable that a company would be able to maintain an antitrust claim 
against Microsoft for failure to continue providing XP support. A federal 
entity, like the Department of Justice or Federal Trade Commission, could 
attempt to make Microsoft deal with its aftermarket competitors. There’s 
only one problem: Microsoft has no aftermarket competitors because 
Windows XP’s source code is both secret and copyrighted. Alternatively, 
consumers themselves could bring suit against Microsoft, but such claims 
are, at best, years away, and the law in this area—as has been shown—favors 
owners of intellectual property rights over consumers. 
This is a terrible conundrum, one that cries out for a legislative solution. 
Make no mistake: Microsoft’s decision to end support for Windows XP 
could be one of the most consequential decisions made by any major 
institution this year. Society will soon need to rethink many old notions like 
property, competition, and innovation in a world where networked 
computers store individuals’ most important and intimate personal 
information.23 
Until the law catches up, however, it will fall to Microsoft alone to make 
the right decision. The company should extend the support clock, release its 
source code, or make clear to the world that if anyone else endeavors to 
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